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Measurable Effects of Denominations on Narrative 
Patterns. The German Case of Diversity  
in Narrating Histories 
Stefan Benz ∗ 
Abstract: »Zum Einfluss der Konfession auf das historische Erzählen. Ein Prob-
lemaufriss für den deutschsprachigen Raum«. There is a view, which I have 
used as the premise for this paper, that historical thinking is evident within the 
narratives of societies as historically existing entities. These narrations can be 
gathered empirically and analyzed for underlying structures. A more common 
research approach, however, is to assume a priori that these structures exist 
and then to look at value judgments from which they can be inferred. In this 
way, various quantitative studies have been carried out that polled the opinions 
of European, and in particular German and Turkish, youths and young adults. 
These have shown that amongst Germans there is ostensibly a strong desire for 
change, from which one can infer an underlying narrative pattern of history as 
progress. Indirect questioning hints at a lacking link with tradition among 
young Germans and even more so in some other Western European cultures, 
mainly those with a distinctly Protestant imprint. In this paper I will establish a 
link between first, these opinion polls, second, the results of psephology since 
the 1950s and third, additional supporting historical evidence in order to argue 
that there is a structural difference between the narratives of German 
Protestants and Catholics, with Catholics showing a stronger tendency towards 
tradition. 
Keywords: Denominations, historical narration, historical consciousness, Ger-
man history, Jörn Rüsen, Hegel. 
1.  Historical Consciousness1 
It is, of course, a commonplace that religious convictions influence people’s 
actions; yet, this is exactly one of the raisons d’être for religion: to explicitly, 
normatively guide what we do.2 Evidence for this can be established empirical-
ly. The topic of my study focuses on the impact transcendence has on historical 
consciousness. However, historical consciousness is a mental category that 
                                                             
∗  Stefan Benz, Faculty for Cultural Studies, Bayreuth University, 95440 Bayreuth, Germany; 
Stefan.Benz@uni-bayreuth.de. 
1  This article has been translated from German by Maren Barton. 
2  Charles Y. Glock’s “consequential dimension”: Glock 1965/1973, here 34-7. 
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cannot be directly observed as it only covers the structures of one’s historical 
thinking. As such, it is at least partially interposed between religion and actual 
behavior, thus forming part of one’s mental structure. The term ‘historical 
consciousness’ is, in Germany, largely confined to the context of the method-
ology used for history teaching (Jeismann 2000, 46-72; Schönemann 2012, 
98-111; Kölbl 2012, 112-20). Therefore, I would like to give a short defini-
tion of what it implies. An oft-used definition by Theodor Schieder (1974) 
stresses that, unlike previous usage (Hasberg 2001; Benz 2014/15, see chapters 
1.1 and 3), historical consciousness is not based on the “correct order” of his-
torical content, but rather that it in itself is a conceptual structure that is both 
transtemporal and transcultural: 
“Historical consciousness means to always keep in mind that human beings 
and all their institutions and forms of partnership exist in (a certain) time – i.e. 
having an origin and a future – and do not represent something stable, un-
changeable and without prerequisites.” (Theodor Schieder)3 Consequently, we 
now do not talk about ‘the German historical consciousness’ but ‘the historical 
consciousness of the Germans’. Due to its not being overtly normative, the 
term has spread beyond the narrow confines4 of its origin in history teaching 
methodology. Thus, the Egyptologist Jan Assmann (Assmann 1992, 66, see 
also 132) felt confident in stating in 1992 that “historical consciousness has 
become a universal in anthropology.” 
Several attempts have been made to deconstruct the term systematically into 
its relevant dimensions in order to analyze historical consciousness structurally 
(Pandel 1987, 130-42). The central dimension appears to be historicity, i.e. the 
means of registering the tension between stability or continuity on the one hand 
and change or development on the other (a classic example being the biological 
process of aging). We can see how historical change is perceived and processed 
by taking a look at narrations about the past, in which past events are shaped 
into ‘history’ – this process being the essential point of the ‘linguistic turn’ 
(Daniel 2001). Based on this, Jörn Rüsen (2001, 1-13, here see 9) concludes: 
“At the centre of the question of historical consciousness is the mental practice 
of narrating a story.” 
The concept of historical consciousness was taken up by researchers in his-
tory teaching methodology. They were trying to clarify its structures as well as 
investigate its concrete manifestations, initially amongst young people. 
                                                             
3  Jeismann 5th ed. 1997, 42-4, here 42, quoting from: Schieder 1974, 73-103, here 78f. 
4  For the significance of the late 1970s for teaching methodology see Hasberg and Seidenfuß 
2015; Sandkühler 2014. 
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2.  Empirical Research and Historical Consciousness 
First, I will consider the structures rather than deal with the actual narratives as 
manifestations of historical thinking. It would be trivial to state that different 
religious denominations tell different stories about the past. This would only 
come as a surprise to those who believe in there being one, and only one, ob-
jective history. It is only natural that Catholic and Protestant school text books 
would tell differing versions of the story of Martin Luther.5 The fact that this 
difference is hardly noticeable nowadays does not mean it does not exist any-
more. It does, but it has so drastically lost significance for society in Germany 
today that it literally does not matter any longer. 
Whilst it is possible to analyze content hermeneutically, the problem arose 
of how one could record the structure of narrations, of types of narratives. The 
situation at hand was this: After communism collapsed in 1989, the question 
was in the 1990s what its impact on historical consciousness had been. To 
establish this, empirical studies were carried out with 15-year-olds across Eu-
rope and then worldwide. For this, “narrating” had to be broken up into state-
ments that could then be analyzed quantitatively. Researchers drew on the 
theoretical model established by the German historical theorist Jörn Rüsen, 
which had been published in both German and English.6 
First let us focus on the empirical studies. These were conducted from 1988 
onwards by the historian and educationalist Bodo von Borries. Whilst his pre-
vious work had focused mainly on autobiographical material and had therefore 
had a qualitative basis, the studies that started in 1988 were based quantitative-
ly (Borries, Pandel and Rüsen 1991). Initially, in the context of the German 
reunification, the focus was on comparing East and West Germans, specifically 
regarding the ideological residue of communism. In the following years, from 
1991 onwards, this was broadened into a Europe-wide study called ‘Youth and 
History’, which was carried out in 27 different countries with 30 samples taken 
in each country between 1994 and 1995. The central idea was that historical 
consciousness in Europe constitutes a significant political factor regarding the 
processes of European unification and adjustment (Borries 1999, 15f.). Ques-
tionnaires were used to test 32,000 ninth-graders as well as 1,270 teachers in 
countries as diverse as Iceland and Israel, Russia and Portugal. Naturally, the 
wide range of the study led to a number of problems. From a German perspec-
tive it was regrettable that Austria and Switzerland declined to take part. An-
other drawback was that the actual questions did not differentiate along denom-
                                                             
5  Strangely enough it was especially Catholic textbooks that discussed this situation: Lehrbuch 
der allgemeinen Weltgeschichte zum Gebrauche katholischer Schulen eingerichtet. Neue von 
Herrn Prof. Müller in Mainz ... vermehrte Auflage, Bamberg/Würzburg 1790, 365-7. 
6  Rüsen 2005, 12, 27-34. The narrative patterns introduced by Hayden White into historio-
graphical writing do not appear applicable to demographic or social inquiries. 
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inational lines where this would have made sense (Germany, as well as possi-
bly the Netherlands: Borries 1999, 23). Only ethnic or national minorities were 
flagged up, such as Russians in the Baltics, South Tyroleans, Arab Israelis, 
even though often these could only have been identified in the first place by 
using religious criteria. Often, this internal differentiation when looking at a 
nation proved successful, as frequently it showed more significant differences 
within a country than between different nations (for example, in the case of 
Estonia between ethnic Russians and Estonians). However, regarding East and 
West Germany, pilot studies showed unexpectedly small differences.7 
Designing the questionnaires was difficult not just because they had to be 
fully translatable into a variety of languages, but also because of the cultural 
context involved. The conflict between the necessary specificity that is required 
in all contexts of history and the generalization needed for international usage 
could only be negotiated by means of hermeneutic interpretation (Borries 1999, 
25f., 28-30). The results were published in two large monographs (Angvik 
1997; Borries 1999) and a variety of articles about key aspects that focused on 
individual problems (Borries 2004, 2003, 229-48). 
Unlike previous studies about historical topics which could be turned into 
attention-grabbing headlines, the results of ‘Youth and History’ were not mar-
ketable and thus went largely unnoticed (Borries 1999, 38f.). Structural insights 
are no good for rankings and therefore made no impact in neighboring academ-
ic disciplines. 
This brings us back to the aforementioned central matter of structure, name-
ly Rüsen’s theory of historical narration. This theory, a core of Rüsen’s theoret-
ical work in history, had played a part in the design and interpretation of the 
empirical studies.8 Rüsen identifies four types of historiographic construction 
of meaning: traditional, exemplary, critical and genetic narration. For our pur-
poses it will suffice to consider the traditional and genetic models. Within the 
concept of historicity a traditional narrative finds meaning by focusing on the 
aspect of the static seen, in isolation, as continuity or permanence in transition. 
Traditional narrators make sense of people’s experience of the world by con-
necting it to the origins of the current world order and forms of life. Ideas of 
permanence and continuity dominate, which means that socially pre-given 
concepts are accepted in a normative appellative way. Teachers normatively 
take up and pass on these pre-given ideas, which explains why the quite multi-
faceted term ‘tradition’ was chosen (Wiedenhofer 2005, 253-79; Philips 2004, 
                                                             
7  Borries 1997, 49; Borries 1999, 17. The teachers however showed differences: Borries 2001, 
7-32, illustration 6: In East Germany – as could be expected – the progress model and the 
dominance of definite facts dominated. In West Germany, however, the idea of history as a 
sequence of forms of society was clearly rejected, as was the concept of class war as a driver 
of history. Consequently, there was only little influence on the school population. 
8  See above note 6. In German: Rüsen 2013, 210-5; Rüsen 1982, 514-605. 
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3-29). ‘Tradition’ leans towards a politically conservative direction whereas 
‘genetic’ does not appear to be normatively loaded in a similar way. Rüsen 
explains genetic construction of meaning (genetic narrative) as changes being 
meaningful in themselves. This manifests itself, he says, as a dynamic of 
change which “makes the transformation of human life patterns shed its terror 
[...] Instead, change itself becomes a form of life suited to man”: Becoming 
‘other’ is a life chance (Rüsen 2013, 213) – yet, given that death is the ultimate 
otherness, this assertion at first seems strange. However, in social sciences the 
concept of change is overwhelmingly positively connoted. There it implicitly 
contains the paradigm of progress whilst its antonyms include not just steadi-
ness but the definitely negatively connoted backwardness.9 Rüsen (1994, 40, 
2nd ed. 2008, 39) says: “The powers of change are interpreted as factors of 
continuity, the restlessness of time as the engine of its permanence.” Rüsen and 
the theoreticians following him mostly leave no doubt that the genetic type of 
historiographic narration is the normatively most desirable one.10 
Figure 1: Comparison of the Most Important Forms of Meaning by Historical 
Narration (Following Jörn Rüsen) 
Meaning by Traditional Explanation  
(Traditional Narrative) 
Meaning by Genetic Forms of Explanation 
(Genetic Narrative) 
variability of time is dominated by persis-
tence/ duration meaning is created by change itself 
continuity of norms provides orientation historicity is purely seen as development 
looking for origins, for starting points often connected to progress as a hidden principle of history 
change is seen as threatening change is seen as opportunity 
 seems to be politically conservative, 
backward 
 may be the genuine Western explana-
tion; pupils ought to learn this form of 
narration 
 
However, I consider this evaluation to be a cultural assertion as this view and 
its validity are based merely on a historical (see below) but not a theoretical 
foundation.11 First and foremost we need to note the following: Narrations 
regarding the past always rely on the perception of change – if people had 
never experienced randomness then there would be no history because history 
needs to be perceived as the act of reducing contingencies by means of making 
                                                             
9  Langreiter and Lanzinger 2002, 11-26, 12. Thomas Gil’s definition therefore is a ‘neutral’ 
one: “Transformation processes are complexly mediated change processes” (Gil 2005, 103). 
So, tradition here forms a concept of thinking and not an umbrella term for a number of 
values linked with modern European conservatism (analyzed by Galland and Lemel 2006). 
10  Kölbl 2004, 52f. (forming part of his project report). Von Borries’ pupil Andreas Körber 
criticized the one-sidedness of the emphasis on change, see: Körber 2005, 212-27, 217f. 
Even more fundamental reflections can be found in Schulz-Hageleit 2012, 117-9, 142-5. 
11  Borries said similar, though in a less apodictic vein, after concluding his studies, see Borries 
1999, 380. 
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sense of events. This is true of both genetic and traditional ways of constructing 
meaning, even though the traditional type has a tendency contrary to change 
and thus tends to reduce it by explaining it away. Yet, acknowledging change 
should not lead to immediate value judgments as the genetic structure tends to 
do; changes happen, but this does not mean that they should automatically be 
viewed as positive. Only those who have the power to bring about change will 
rationally judge in this one-way sense. Reform, seen as change, is not a value 
in and by itself, even though the word ‘reform’ is often used to mean a positive 
innovation unlike its actual etymological roots.12 In this way Rüsen, maybe 
unintentionally, commits himself to the concept of progress as historical narra-
tion with the state being a factor of permanence and a power for change. He 
thus follows in the footsteps of the philosopher Hegel (who was born a 
Protestant). 
Hegel’s position, however, was quite extreme at the time (1770-1831): Frie-
drich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, his fellow student in Tübingen, whilst 
considering whether a philosophy of history was possible, defined the subject 
of history as the changeable, “not the remaining, the permanent, but that which 
moves on in time” (Schelling 1797/1856, 466, 470). His conclusion was that 
“what is not progressive is not an object of history.” Yet, this did not mean that 
progress was immanent in history. It referred simply to change, alteration, and 
thus the perception of change, which is what causes historical consciousness to 
react by processing it, and the separation from the realms of nature. 
It is my theory that this cultural construct of Hegel/Rüsen’s should be con-
sidered genuinely Protestant.13 One of the backbones of its meaning is progress, 
meaning a positive development. From this originates a thought pattern that has 
an often unconscious influence on Western thinking and thus guides Western 
actions, for example regarding foreign development aid.14 
Empirically this would mean that Catholic (and Muslim) societies ought to 
display a tendency towards the traditional construction of meaning. Whilst this 
gross generalization might raise hackles immediately, it is worth noting that 
some supporting evidence may be found when we look at current debates about 
the social acceptance of homosexuality and its legality in canonical law or 
                                                             
12  It may be interesting for humanities scholars to compare connotations and semantic associ-
ations of change or (latin) mutatio in different languages. 
13  In conversation with the author in spring 2015, Rüsen positioned his cultural roots in Ger-
man Protestantism. Schulz-Hageleit 2012, 119, asked whether the didactic of meaning may 
be something particularly German. For a transcultural insight see the debate on the ques-
tion of the Jewish collective memory, especially discussing progress as a genuine Christian 
model of narration: Raz-Krakotzkin 2007, 530-43, here 535, referring generally to Funken-
stein 1989, 5-26, here 14. Cf. Assmann 2001, 63-87. 
14  I am grateful to Jan Kok (Nijmegen). He mentioned <www.developmentalidealism.org>, 
debating the question of modeling the world exactly in the form represented by North-
West Europe: see Thornton (2005).  
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historical developments such as the ordination of women clergy in Protestant 
parishes. 
3.  Narration and Religion 
It is now time to return to the aforementioned empirical studies. Our first focus 
is on the general concept of religion. This was phrased in the survey as reli-
gious bonds because religion itself could have been seen as a competing way of 
constructing meaning, a competing worldview.15 As E. Wunder pointed out 
(2005, 39): “The defining problem of religion lies in the way it copes with 
contingency”. Consequently, historiographic construction of meaning and 
religious ideas compete functionally with each other. However, the demarcation 
so far has remained quite vague because of the predominance of ideas of secular-
izing in the disciplines of Social Sciences and History. Shifting functions and 
re-prioritizations instead of secularization have hardly been discussed so far.16 
The results of the study were therefore eagerly awaited, especially as an ini-
tial international pilot study had demonstrated that pupils in Poland and Russia 
showed stronger religious bonds than German youths (Borries and Rüsen 1994; 
Borries 1995). Whilst this may not have been much of a surprise for Poland, it 
definitely was an unexpected result for Russia due to its long communist tradi-
tion. The teachers’ responses, however, noticeably reflected the communist 
tradition, unlike the pupils’. 
In the main study, the factor of religious bonds played a “considerable role” 
and was addressed, in the first instance, by checking the knowledge of contents 
and interest in different eras. Borries concluded: “The gradation of religious 
bonds in the survey appears to give us a reliable picture of the true situation in 
Europe and provides a key metric for explaining variation [...].”17 The more 
religious the pupils the more interested in history they were. 
The survey also looked at levels of agreement with figures for constructing 
meaning, namely the narrative structures negotiating permanence and change. 
In the first, German surveys, this could only be judged as insignificant for 
pupils (Borries, Pandel and Rüsen 1991, 291-3). In the main, international 
study it was particularly Rüsen’s preferred, Protestant-connoted genetic con-
struction of meaning that remained without any relevance whatsoever: The data 
                                                             
15  Rüsen 2006, 119-33. Still offering valuable insights into the tension between historicity 
(change) and values: Stern 1962. For a historical explanation: Sommer 2006. 
16  Wunder 2005, 90-118; Pohlig 2008; Lorenz 2008, 24-59, here 52-8; Hartney 2014, in par-
ticular the chapter by Ian Tregenza, Secularism, Myth and History, 173-89. 
17  Borries 1999, 43, 51. German history teaching methodologists did not know what to with 
these results. Maybe the best use can be found in Schreiber 2000. 
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was fuzzy.18 It was impossible to systematize statements that history served for 
problem-solving in the present or as an orientation for the future. There was a 
mildly positive response only when future and past were combined without 
using the factors “change” or “development.” 
This points towards the traditional construction of meaning, which achieved 
remarkable results: There was a correlation between motivation for history (e.g. 
marks at school), traditional construction of meaning and religious bonds (nar-
rowly defined as personal piety!) which the researchers deprecatingly summed 
up as “authoritarian traditionalism”. It should be stressed that the respondents 
felt religion plays only a limited role for the present and an even smaller role 
for the future. This shows they subscribe to secularization or an expectation of 
decline and positioned themselves against the trend. Religion thus showed 
itself to be a “key metric of historical consciousness” (Borries 1999, 290-1, 
211, 336; 2000, 317-8). Bodo von Borries:  
The distribution regarding the ‘traditional formation of meaning being a pur-
pose of history’ is fairly stark (more than the standard deviation between 
country maxima and minima) and surprisingly clear: All ‘modernized’ (i.e. 
rich, radically personalized and secularized) North and Western European 
countries show mean values that are below average (except secluded and 
comparatively less ‘modern’ exceptions Portugal, Spain and Iceland). All ‘tra-
ditional’ Middle Eastern countries – with the understandable exception of the 
‘westernized’ Israel – show significantly above-average traditionalism, name-
ly more than half a standard deviation above the European average. The for-
mer Eastern bloc is located – with fairly inconsistent values – at around aver-
age. Some ‘post-socialist’ samples, especially the ‘religiously bound’ 
Ukrainians and Poles, seem rather ‘traditional’ whilst others (especially the 
secularized Hungarians and Czechs) express ‘anti-traditional’ views. [Italics in 
the original] (Borries 2000, 318) 
The traditional countries overwhelmingly are from a non-Protestant back-
ground. There are exceptions to this, however, which would need to be dis-
cussed individually. In the case of Hungary and especially the Czech Republic, 
which culturally appear Catholic, it is significant that Catholicism and its val-
ues are strongly linked to the controversial (even condemned) rule of the Cath-
olic Habsburg dynasty. Germany, Southern Tyrol, Protestant Scotland, Ortho-
dox Russia – which had produced rather different results in a previous pilot 
study – and Protestant Finland all count among those countries where the anti-
traditionalism of the ‘modern West’ is still only weakly represented. 
 
                                                             
18  For this and the following cf. the summary in Borries 2000, 307-35, here 322. 
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Figure 2: Traditional Formation of Meaning  
 
Source: Borries 2000, 318. 
 
But can these results really be interpreted along religious and denominational 
lines? The German position roughly in the middle between Poland and Turkey 
at one end of the scale and the Netherlands at the other end could indeed be 
explained in this way as Germany historically and culturally consists of both 
denominations in roughly equal halves. Apart from Switzerland, Germany is 
the only country in Europe where there is religious parity or relative equality 
for the minority.19 
In all other countries, the societies have a clear majority religion, with some 
countries having state religions. Protestant religions have a reputation, both 
generally and in Germany, as having been more secularized and for a longer 
time. They therefore have a weaker cohesive effect and their bases are declin-
ing more sharply. This leads to a situation in which the traditional ways of 
constructing meaning can be rejected more easily, such as the classic example 
of traditional formation of meaning: religious origin stories. 
A study by the psychologist Haci-Halil Uslucan unintentionally20 provides 
us with the opportunity to conduct a comparison from the perspective of the 
genetic construction of meaning. He analyzed the value framework of young 
Turks living in Germany, Turks living in Turkey (both of whom essentially 
form one group) and Germans. For the Germans, their denominational belong-
                                                             
19  Compare the worldwide situation: Atlas der Globalisierung 2011, 89. 
20  Uslucan had no knowledge of the studies conducted within the subject area of history 
teaching methodology. Uslucan 2008, 276-98. The homepage is informative: 
<http://www.uslucan.de> (accessed Oct 1, 2015). 
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ing went unrecorded, but they appear to have been recruited in Berlin and 
Magdeburg and therefore can be assumed to be Protestant – at least in their 
habits. The strongest divergence occurred with regard to the values of spiritual-
ity, respect for tradition and a “stimulating life”. Whilst the Germans held the 
last of these in high regard, the first two did not hold major significance for 
them. Uslucan concluded that migrants operate in a (more) conservative value 
framework. Using the abovementioned study “Youth and History” these results 
can be analyzed further with a view to relating them to historical conscious-
ness. Young Turks show stronger religious bonds (spirituality) and stressed the 
value of tradition which here, importantly, is taken to mean not specific con-
tents21 but rather an underlying respect for their origins. According to von 
Borries both of these aspects should be considered interrelated. The ‘stimulat-
ing life’ preferred by German youths is in line with an acceptance of historical 
change and thus links in with Rüsen’s concept of the genetic formation of 
meaning which is generally in contrast to the motivation for history. 
This contrast demonstrates that amongst young Germans the construction of 
meaning is normatively anti-traditional and this is much more pronounced than 
the relation to the present found in the genetic formation of meaning as estab-
lished by von Borries (Borries 2000, 322). I think that the interest in a stimulat-
ing life, i.e. a life that is rich in contingencies, challenges and unforeseen 
events should be seen as a kind of fashion statement rather than young people 
personally subscribing to it in their private lives. Within society it is considered 
expedient and fashionable to lead a stimulating life – or at least to claim that 
one does. The problem is that studies of this kind only surveyed levels of 
agreement with vision statements rather than the practical ability for construct-
ing meaning or even for actually implementing a stimulating life. This produc-
es socially desirable answers to these programmatic questions, but answers 
which in practice are not actually applied and remain without consequence, as 
can often be demonstrated by more in-depth probing. Von Borries showed this 
in one of the pilot studies, which analyzed, amongst other aspects, belief in 
progress as a narrative concept. This showed a double-sided response. On the 
one hand, from an abstract point of view a skeptical approach towards progress 
was seen as socially desirable (for example, regarding environmental aware-
ness and limits to growth). On the other hand, more indirect questioning 
showed that respondents clearly valued the present highly and expected a high-
er level of security, order and progress for themselves and Germany as a whole 
in the future. This was even more pronounced the older and more successful in 
their education the respondents were (Borries 1992, 70-6, 135, 175-9; Borries 
1994, 193). The results clearly demonstrated a paradox consisting of explicit 
                                                             
21  The Catholic church has made this a dogma in the Tridentinum in 1563 by defining tradition 
as a source of faith (in contradiction to the ‘sola scriptura’ principle) whilst not defining 
what the term tradition actually encompasses: Cf. Thils 1937. 
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skepticism of modernization and implicitly ascertained criticism of the past (the 
classic example being the medieval ‘dark ages’). So, despite the demonstrative, 
programmatic skepticism, a – naive – trust in progress remains intact unshaken 
as the indirect probing indicated. 
To return to Uslucan, this means that the values of genetic formation of 
meaning, such as a lack of tradition and the desire for contingency do not nec-
essarily actually get put into practice. What it does mean is that amongst young 
adults these values are indeed considered the value base of Western, modern 
society and are accepted as such.22 Studies regularly conducted by the Al-
lensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research, which looked at people’s views 
of Islam, produced similar results. In those surveys the tension between respond-
ents’ own norms and their perception of others was visible in the questioning. In 
2012 77% of Germans agreed with the statement that Islam strongly held onto 
long-established, traditional tenets of faith.23 The Allensbach Institute used this 
as evidence for claiming that the general image of Islam was “disastrous.” 
What exactly do pollsters expect religion to be if not traditional tenets of faith? 
4.  Narration and Denomination 
The question arises of what actual impact all of the above has on historical 
consciousness. It would appear that the rejection of tradition has become the 
socially desirable norm (Rüsen) as well as a socially accepted fact (Uslucan). 
This rejection of tradition and the prevalence of change are the principles 
which foster genetic narration, or ‘progress narratives’ in the Hegelian sense. 
In this context we should remember that when Hegel constructed his univer-
sal history for recent times,24 he gave its content definite anti-Catholic barbs. 
He got to know the Catholic Church personally during his time in Bamberg and 
came to consider it an enemy of his system – and quite rightly so.25 
 
                                                             
22  Cf. in particular the Koselleck pupil François Hartog on temporality phenomena: Hartog 
2015; a short account can be found in: id. 2010, 85-90. 
23  Petersen 2012: <http://www.ifd-allensbach.de/uploads/tx_reportsndocs/November12_ 
Islam_01.pdf>. In 2015 there was a more recent inquiry: Petersen 2016, 18-21, which 
showed 75 % of respondents agreeing. This publication is based on an inquiry not yet pub-
lished but communicated to the author by Dr. Petersen, Allensbach Institute. 
24  Based on the original German text: Hegel 1970/1986, esp. 140, 455-67, 485, 497, 519, 523f., 
526f., 531, 534f. 
25  Mattes 1851, 83-7, esp. 85f. During an extensive journey Mattes had the opportunity to 
listen to Hegel at the Berlin university. 
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Figure 3: Patterns of Narration 
 
Progress as Described by Hegel in Lectures on the Philosophy of 
History 
1) Middle ages – dark ages: rule of the church, struggle of the rising political 
power of the state against the popes (dawn) 
2) Reformation: initial rise and progress of the spirit; reconciliation of the state 
and (new)26 church; second step: Start of the Enlightenment (daylight) 
2a. French Revolution caused by Catholicism of France (no revolution in 
Germany – but compare the “revolutions” in some Catholic territories such 
as Liège, Mainz, Passau, Brabant [S. B.]) 
3) Last stage of history – the present: Prussia as Protestant power, Catholic 
church faces its downfall 
With this representation, Hegel proves himself to be a true disciple of the 
Protestant town of Tübingen where he attended university. Hegel’s view of 
history was argued from a Protestant perspective and further elaborated on 
accordingly by German historiographers from a ‘kleindeutsch’ background (i.e. 
favoring a union of Northern German states without leadership or influence of 
Austria and the Habsburgs) in the 19th century. As a consequence, the Catholic 
side had no option but to reject not just these narratives but their genetic struc-
ture, too (Sandl 2007, 529-563). The narrative structure that studies have 
proved with regard to Poland, Spain, Turkey and young Turkish people in 
Germany can therefore, in my opinion, be attributed to German Catholics, even 
though there are no absolute empirical-demographic data. 
                                                             
26  New vs. old denomination: Jörgensen 2014. 
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5.  Is It Even Possible to Inherit a Basic Narrative 
Structure? – Narrative Research and Psephology 
If it is possible to ascribe to Catholics (as well as to many other religious 
groups) a tendency towards traditional constructions of meaning and, vice 
versa, to Protestants a preference and predisposition towards progress as an 
expression of genetic formation of meaning, then this would have had to be 
passed down the generations almost like a heritable trait.27 One needs to as-
sume such a hereditary process because the influence of the church has undeni-
ably shrunk drastically amongst Christians over the last few decades. As a 
result Christian religious cultures have lost the ability to influence people’s 
mentalities directly28. There must, therefore, be a kind of historical unconscious 
(Borries 2008, 95-8) which makes a transference (passing down of patterns) 
possible across generations. At this point we could just accept this assumption 
in line with Hayden White – White being well-known for having declared that 
all historiography fundamentally depends on fixed, unconsciously chosen nar-
rative structures. Instead, I prefer to use two unrelated explanations, as ex-
plained below. 
5.1  Narrative Research 
Literature studies uses brain research to argue that familiar narrative patterns 
not just structure our perception but can also be passed on unconsciously and 
can build new content in keeping with the existing patterns: “Cultural assimila-
tion largely happens by means of adapting foreign materials into one’s own 
narrative patterns, which themselves are an expression of the ‘enduring past’ of 
the collective in question” (Koschorke 2013, 31-2). This means that patterns, 
once established, are not lost even if the situation that imprinted them, such as 
denominational ties, does not exist anymore. Instead they erode away over time 
in a long process involving several generations. Thus the deciding factor for the 
narrative habit is not just one’s current identity, important as this may be in this 
age of secularized individuality. Rather, what matters is one’s historical mem-
bership of a cultural memory, such as a denomination. Possibly structures 
surface from the unconscious exactly when the individual is so distant from the 
cultural group that he/she does not expect such influences anymore. 
Psychology calls this the unconscious, a term that has also been discussed 
within the realms of the history teaching methodology. There does not appear 
                                                             
27  For the ‘biological’ intergenerational transmission of traumatic experiences, which in historical 
theory are nothing more than special events, cf. <http://www.biologicalpsychiatryjournal. 
com/article/S0006-3223%2810%2900576-7/abstract> (accessed October 16, 2015). 
28  See Schulz-Hageleit for the question of heredity via cultural memory: Schulz-Hageleit 2012, 
67, 85f., 97, 292. 
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to have been a systematic overview of the historical dimension of this uncon-
scious over the longer term of several generations and with a focus on previous 
religious imprinting. The debate has largely been led by Peter Schulz-Hageleit 
and has concentrated mostly on effects of experiences of National Socialism 
and the later years of WWII. 29 
Historical theory also assumes the unconscious adoption of patterns 
(Dominick LaCapra (Paul 2015, 26-7, 52-3; Wischermann 1996, 55-85, 77-8)). 
Whatever we spend time interpreting can shape us in return, which is why 
historians are often accused of having a closer mental affinity with the past 
than with their own present. This would mean that the concept of genetic for-
mation of meaning is continually being absorbed and internalized by the recipi-
ent. Even more significant is the perception that, due to transmission across 
generations, people are by necessity always a product of the past, that they 
form a horizon (Hans-Georg Gadamer) with the past, and that insights can only 
be the product of a reflective examination of the inherited tradition (Paul 2015, 
49-52; Philips 2004, 18-22). Let us not call it a dialogue with the past – the past 
doesn’t answer (Pihlainen 2014, 575-82). Consequently individuals ought to 
consider it essential to raise the inherited narrative structure into their con-
sciousness – yet this usually does not happen as empirical studies about the 
inconsequential nature of programmatic normative statements have shown. 
We can therefore theoretically assume that the intergenerational transference 
of narrative patterns does indeed occur. 
5.2  Psephology 
The closest relative of history teaching methodology is opinion polling or pse-
phology. This is for two reasons: Firstly, it is immediately evident that there is 
a structural connection between one’s political decisions and one’s historical 
thinking. Content-based historical opinions and thought patterns such as faith 
in progress are linked. The second reason has a historic basis: Research into the 
causes of the rise of National Socialism in Germany started, early on, to pay 
attention to the denomination of voters, especially as both statistical data and 
denominational data by polling district were available for the national elections 
(Reichstagswahl) in July 1932. This research, first published in 1946,30 is still 
one of the emotionally loaded topics of recent German history because of the 
clear correlation it established between polling districts showing a majority 
                                                             
29  Schulz-Hageleit 2012. I am grateful to Peter Schulz-Hageleit for all his support, hints, and 
stimulating conversation. The mental consequences of the Shoah have been debated for 
decades; non-victims have recently been the focus of Sabine Bode, author of non-fiction 
books about them. 
30  Schmidtchen 1973, 220. The starting point for comparative research into denominations can 
probably be found in differing suicidal behavior (pp. 475-503), unless we count Hegel’s eco-
nomic-historical musings about denominational behavior (Hegel 1970/1986, 111f.). 
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vote for the NSDAP and being predominantly Protestant. This followed British 
public opinion which had made the connection between Protestantism and 
Hitler already during WWII.31 Denomination thus came to be considered a 
factor in voting decisions in Germany until the drive for deconfessionaliza-
tion,32 at the latest in the 1960s, pushed it from the public mind. Today it would 
be very difficult to establish data sets comparable to those of 193233, especially 
as it would be necessary nowadays to collect data on what denomination the 
majority of a person’s ancestors belonged to. Nonetheless the discussion of 
denomination as a decision-making factor still continues in Germany, albeit 
with a declining tendency.34 
The success of the Conservative CDU/CSU party, which can be considered 
the heir and successor of the Zentrum party, does indeed rest mostly upon 
Catholics. The voting decisions of Protestants in what was the FRG, however, 
are not that clear cut and were at least partially dependent on external factors. 
Nonetheless, it was stated as late as 1989 that “denominational belonging still 
determines current voting behavior with undiminished force” (Schmitt 1989, 
223). And this is despite the fact that church ties – even amongst Catholics – 
have decreased drastically. The most recent studies even rejected the assump-
tion that the tendency was towards a shift from a denominational to a religion-
based divide (separation between Christians/non-Christians). Instead, the re-
sults indicated a partial reconfessionalization of voting behavior (Schmitt 1989, 
235; Roßteutscher 2012, 120). 
With regard to the possibility of the heredity/transference of narrative pat-
terns, which are probably reflected in voting decisions, it has been shown re-
peatedly since the 1950s that unconscious religious effects can be observed 
even amongst people who have long left their religious group. We can there-
                                                             
31  Forstner 2012. Berlin: <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/2012-2-052.pdf> 
(accessed May 3, 2017); cf. Köhler and van Melis 1998; Schulze 1989, 219. 
32  For factors of explicit and implicit deconfessionalization see Wunder 2005, 118-28. 
33  The author corresponded in this matter with the German Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal 
Statistical Office), which no longer collects denominational data or links it with voting dis-
tricts. This data would have to be gathered individually via the churches’ statistical offices, 
but the boundaries of their districts differ from the voting districts. A comparison between 
denomination and voting decisions for political parties would thus be very difficult to es-
tablish: Statistisches Bundesamt. F203-Wanderungen, Bevölkerungsfortschreibung, Jutta 
Gebhardt by email on 7th November 2014; Statistisches Bundesamt. Office of the Bun-
deswahlleiter: Party votes (Zweitstimmen) percentages can be found at <http:// 
www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/bundestagswahlen/BTW_BUND_13/veroeffentlichungen/ergebnis
se/index.html>; <http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/bundestagswahlen/BTW_BUND_13/ 
wahlkreiseinteilung/kartographische_darstellung.html> (accessed November 10, 2014). 
34  Works consulted: Schmidtchen 1973. This is a Zurich 1965 habilitation thesis by a Swiss 
author; Schmidtchen 1974, 57-103; Schmitt 1989 (228-233 for a critical appraisal of 
Schmidtchen, who, it says, tended towards the ahistoric perpetuation of certain patterns 
and disregarding their historical dependency; cf. my part Teil VI); Kühnel 2009, available 
digitally, no entries regarding denomination; Roßteutscher 2012, 111-33. 
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fore state that world views and motivation structures remain intact (Schmidtch-
en 1973, 28-32; Schmitt 1989, 140) – or, as I think we can add, are adopted 
unquestioningly from one’s ancestors. In this way, psephology and narrative 
research confirm each other’s findings. 
In addition, psephology can also be called upon in the matter of traditional 
versus genetic narratives, over and above merely the potential heredity. The 
philosopher Panajotis Kondylis, with a background different from psepholo-
gists or political researchers, was amazed (Kondylis 1986, 507) how the con-
servative parties in Europe (he published this in 1986!) were definitely sold on 
(economic) progress and yet managed to appeal to ‘conservative’ voters. Pse-
phologists would reply that for the CDU (German Conservative Party) their 
deconfessionalization was the key (Schmitt 1989, 305). From the point of view 
of historical consciousness being involved in the decision-making process, 
however, it would appear more significant that the CDU, unlike the left-of-
centre SPD, historically does not embody the genetic narrative – even though 
in its substance it subscribes to so-called progress. 
Regarding the German Protestants’ fatal voting decision in favor of the 
NSDAP, Gerhard Schmidtchen stresses in his Zürich habilitation thesis (1973) 
on German voters – in keeping with the concept of genetic formation of mean-
ing – the following factors to explain the underlying intertwining of German 
Protestantism with the National Socialist movement. To mention a few without 
going into detail: mistaken romanticism about the German Reich and a meta-
physical sense of homelessness; a heightened belief in progress (which has 
been empirically strongly proven); as well as the Protestant dialectic of pro-
gress, a consequence of the open theological system and thus the idea that the 
development of the world follows an upward trajectory. All of these factors 
point towards genetic formation of meaning as being a narrative form that 
shows a clear tendency toward a higher level of development which is consid-
ered to be objective and is constructed by means of the narrative (Schmidtchen 
1973, 218, 233, 311-20, 457). 
“Weakly attached” Protestants felt confused by the absence of an ultimate 
authority, especially if historically they had turned away from the church as an 
institution. As a consequence, they took their insecurities away from the con-
text of religion and instead turned to contemporary movements to address 
them. Schmidtchen (1973, 466, 468, 514) argued that not everyone was suited 
to existing in an ‘open world.’ It was a logical consequence that Protestants 
started looking for ‘substitute churches’ which offered new chances but also 
opened people up more to the temptations inherent in these movements: They 
started subscribing to whatever political system was in power – which showed 
in their voting decisions, as can be proved empirically. 
 The data available to us provides two more clues. Firstly, ecclesiastical his-
tory confirms Schmidtchen’s explanation that people lacked strong foundations 
due to Protestant theology giving them too few positive beliefs. If we consider 
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the 16th century, we find that not long after the death of Martin Luther Protes-
tantism fell apart even in central Germany (Sandl 2013, 253-75). Secondly, it is 
noticeable that Catholics are fundamentally more ecumenically-minded than 
Protestants and that even ex-Protestants shy away from a Catholicizing united 
church much more strongly than vice versa. Similar attitudes can be seen in the 
rejection of mixed-religion marriages, from which one can infer a negative way 
of self-definition.35 Their identity is defined by anti-Catholicism. There are 
clear parallels to Hegel in this regard, who clearly positioned himself in an anti-
Catholic manner, but appears to have avoided a clear break with the Protestant 
institutional church in Berlin despite his obviously pantheistic overall point of 
view. From a historical perspective (Eibach and Sandl 2003) this self-definition 
often means that ‘the Germans’ have to define themselves as anti-Catholic and 
anti-papal, which has a strong historical component, especially regarding as-
sessments made of the Middle Ages. Even today, the attitude of the German 
public retains this inherited ambivalence towards Catholicism, as a Swiss study 
showed: In the media, a disproportionately large amount of reporting can be 
observed to have a clear negative slant regarding Catholicism.36 To see the 
‘Other’ as negative, therefore, may still be having consequences in the way 
people’s mentality works. 
Apart from a negative self-definition against Catholicism, there are also pos-
itive indicators for the genetic aspect (Schmidtchen 1974, 96), namely the 
equivalents of those values Uslucan called the “stimulating life” the Germans 
aspired to. For example, Schmidtchen analyzed a Protestant lust for the world 
with a preference for travel and new experiences, which links in with an enthu-
siasm for technology and progress. “Only internal evidence through experience 
counts for them” (Schmidtchen 1974, 63f.). There is thus strong psephological 
evidence for the normative nature of change, for the positive view of change, as 
well as for the foregoing of the principle of tradition. Cultural lore, which ac-
tively aids in imprinting historical (un)consciousness and might motivate 
strongly in favor of history (Borries 1997, 45-51, 46), consequently would not 
to be valued highly – as the relative skepticism of traditional narration amongst 
‘Western Protestant’ nations does indeed prove. 
We can now draw our first conclusions. The results produced in different 
academic disciplines support the existence of an unconsciously operating his-
torical consciousness that is prefigured by denomination and that embeds a 
particular narrative structure in a person’s mindset, independent of their indi-
vidual religious beliefs and practices. Catholics, and even more so Protestants, 
                                                             
35  Schmitt 1989, 269; Schmidtchen 1973, 459f. See also the list of anti-Catholic stereotypes in 
Köhle-Hezinger 1976, 99-103. 
36  Study by Media Tenor, Rapperswil 2014: <http://de.mediatenor.com/de/news?start=30> 
(Announcement from April 17, 2014, accessed August 26, 2015). In general cf. Wolffe 2015, 
182-202, dealing with English-speaking countries. 
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prefer opposite structures because they give rise to a different attitude to tradi-
tion, or even to history as a whole. Denomination thus shows a historically 
founded, and thus inevitable, membership of a (memory imprinting) history 
tradition (Luckmann 1991, 16, with regard to religion). For Germany this 
means two history traditions (or two national cultural memories) divided by an 
invisible boundary (word borrowed from: François 1991) and based on the 
unconscious as part of historical consciousness. 
6.  Further Historical Indicators and Conclusions for the 
Present 
Historical evidence for the theses outlined above can easily be collated from 
both the past and the present. Some effects ought to be postulated first and then 
studied if necessary, such as whether Protestants have produced more utopias 
and prophecies than the more strongly attached Catholics.37 It is certain, how-
ever, that in the 19th century the Humanities in Germany had a definitely 
Protestant imprint. This has long been a known fact internationally.38 “It re-
mains striking how crucial European Protestant historians were in setting the 
tone for national historiographies of the nineteenth century.” 39 Historiography 
that was grossdeutsch (‘Greater German’) or even anti-Prussian got marginal-
ized or pejoratively attributed to the “Catholic sciences”.40 Donald R. Kelley 
called this a Protestant chauvinism in the field of history (Kelley 2002, 43). 
The 19th century, one feels, calls to mind not objective science, which was in 
fact a discursive weapon of the Protestant side (Kennedy 2008, 109f.), but 
rather a Second Confessional Era, as research proclaimed some time ago (for 
example Blaschke 2006). 
The deciding factor, however, is the following: The national, political histo-
riography of the 19th and 20th centuries is considered a prime example of the 
genetic formation of meaning. This is the way it showed itself to be culturally 
‘Protestant.’ Luther was styled a national prophet, in line with Hegel (Kennedy 
2008, 124-5; Köhle-Hezinger 1976, 287-92). It has already been outlined as 
part of my argument that Hegel was the central philosopher of genetic for-
mation of meaning, as well as that, generally, classic, material philosophy of 
                                                             
37  Prietz 2014, esp. 449-605: Carion and Melanchthon often included and quoted prophecies in 
their chronicle, which may be considered the most important of the Protestant chronicles. 
38  Gooch 1913. A revised edition in German including some new chapters: Gooch 1964; How-
ard 2000; Berger and Conrad 2015, 36f., 198, 256f., also see 288, 367. Hardtwig 2005, 51-76 
(first published in 1991); Weber 2012, 307-19, follows Hardtwig. 
39  Kennedy 2008, 104-34, 109 (quotation), 110f., especially in Germany; Metzger 2011, 165-71. 
40  The most important opposing historian is Onno Klopp: Weßels 2003. For an overview cf. 
Smith 1995. 
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history always has to proceed genetically. Heidegger stated quite explicitly in 
1938: “Just as inappropriate as any Humanism had to remain to the Greeks, so 
impossible was a medieval worldview, so paradoxical is a Catholic worldview” 
(Heidegger 1977, 69-96, addenda 1938, 94). His intended point was that Catho-
lic historiography abstained from great, genetic concepts to make sense of 
events, was more critical of progress,41 and focused on individual facts or 
smaller institutional units as the center of its historical examination. Already in 
the early modern era the output of Catholic historians can be used to support 
this because in their works the entire genre of ‘History of the Reich’ is missing 
whilst ‘Universal History’ is dealt with guardedly and without an ideological 
slant (Benz 2012, 43-74). 
Thus, development as the concept of and original reason for genetic, mean-
ing-forming historicity historically really can be traced back to Protestantism: 
Firstly, the reformation formed a contingency event that was fully appreciated 
as such by contemporaries and that its supporters judged as entirely positive 
despite its newness (Fuchs 2012, 15-27). At the same time religion got down-
graded and became a part of the secular sphere and of a revolution of princes, 
of citizens, of peasants. This could not be without consequences on the mentali-
ty and the development of the concept of progress. Even the Lutheran doctrine 
of the Last Supper has been declared a trigger for a mentality that aims at indi-
vidualization and progress (Smith 2010, 253-7). If one is a little more re-
strained than this and wants to follow Schmidtchen, thus linking him back with 
history, one could theorize that the lack of an authoritative theological power 
led to an increase in identity and personal responsibility whilst simultaneously 
unsettling the individual structurally. This might not only explain the openness 
to secular saviors, which was reflected in psephological results, but also the 
preference religiously unsettled people show for the genetic formation of mean-
ing. The expectation of contingency, which they feel confronted with more 
than others, can be dealt with more easily if the expected, but unknown, can be 
interpreted as something that has its roots in the past and that can therefore be 
limited. The only thing that can happen is something that was already there in 
the past and develops from it. In this way, history (as narration) and the result-
ing ontology bring about a relative sense of security42: Nothing unexpected can 
happen. Tradition, seen as contaminated by Catholicism, could not compete 
with this.43  
                                                             
41  As Berger noted for the 19th century: Berger 2015, 123. 
42  An opponent of the need to explain everything – a need that especially underlies the genet-
ic formation of meaning – is Schulz-Hageleit: He states that the futilities of history should 
be endured rather than covered up, for example by grief (2012, 302-5). 
43  The various, sometimes peculiar ways in which denominational history traditions reacted to 
these challenges are analyzed systematically in Benz 2015, 213-48. 
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Besides psephology, denominational demarcations in Germany are not total-
ly a thing of the past. During periods of conflict, denominationally-based ar-
guments suddenly resurface in the debate and become openly visible.44 One 
limitation has to be noted, however: We always need to check in how far the 
contrast that is based on denomination and historical patterns of mentalities 
may possibly become hidden underneath inner-German stereotypes (such as the 
classic North-South divide). Psephology has managed to isolate from the data 
that there is, for example, an anti-Bavarian bias amongst voters in Northern 
Germany – whilst the opposite effect does not seem to exist in Bavaria.45 Such 
images of the ‘other’ German, partly based on perception, used to be found in 
older popular literature or folklore (Riehl 5th ed. 1861 and 11th ed. 1908 [first 
publ. 1853]; Grupp 1906) – in the present, they have become part of the inven-
tory of the unconscious. 
Even the trend that Schmidtchen called “mistaken romanticism about the 
Reich,” a historically long-established Protestant preference for overly glorify-
ing the Reich of the Germans (Pohlig 2007), can still be found today. This time 
around it was the Holy Roman Empire of the early modern era that was enjoy-
ing a renaissance as a pre-European success model, despite the fact that its 
contemporaries sometimes did not even think it existed and that afterwards, 
until 1945, it was frequently reviled as weak. Leading academic proponents of 
the ‘Old Reich’ went as far as to pillory opposing opinions regarding the histor-
ical evidence when setting off the debate about the numerous denominational 
conflicts within that Reich.46 
So far in this paper we have seen the historical explanations as well as the 
historical evidence for the existence of preferred narrative patterns. Yet, what is 
their significance outside history lessons and psephology? It is certain that 
academics will need to pay increased attention to denominational residues that 
lie beneath the wide and deep demarcations between the religions. Within 
current political debates the awareness of difference as diversity, even within 
Germany, ought to be strengthened. Unity is celebrated too much (for example 
by means of the national holiday of German Unity Day) and gets confused 
normatively for conformity. The Protestant-imprinted rhetoric of unity inherits 
phraseology that can be traced back as far as the 16th century. It romanticizes 
the concept of consensus which papers over contrasting interests and which 
therefore requires an external enemy for its self-definition: Initially this was 
found in the invading Turkish armies that threatened the country.47 
                                                             
44  At crucial points, attention is sometimes drawn to the fact that both the German Federal 
President, Joachim Gauck, and the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, are Protestants (as of 
2015). Mr. Gauck is a former Protestant clergyman and Mrs. Merkel is a pastor’s daughter. 
45  Roßteutscher 2012, 130f.; cf. Schmitt 1989, 240 with a further hint, 163-5. Thus the voting 
decisions made by the electorate in 1932 are even more remarkable. 
46  Debate about: Luh 1995; Eichhorn 2006, 387f.; cf. also Nicklas 2007, 447-74. 
47  Schmidt 2004/07. The print edition Leiden 2007 was unavailable. See esp. 226-37, 349, 357. 
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The problem posed by the main narrative pattern of historical consciousness 
latently subscribing to a progress-based structure is most pressing with regard 
to transculturality. Of course a blunt contrasting of tradition versus modernity 
is wrong. These terms interrelate, as Philips has pointed out: “tradition be-
comes again a measure of raising essential questions about the ways in which 
we pass on the life of cultures.”48 Yet, this process of negotiating the way needs 
to be raised into our awareness because there is a connection between progress 
and Western Enlightenment and both are culturally bound. A society that does 
not reflect the principle of tradition but considers change the one and only 
possible way will be incapable of intercultural dialogue. Denomination there-
fore (via the section of the mind ‘historical consciousness,’ subsection ‘the 
unconscious’49) has a direct impact on mentality and behavior. 
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